Frank Lahmann: Chapter 4. The Influence of the Colonial Office and Reichstag in German East Africa and South West Africa after 1907
The Influence of the Colonial Office and Reichstag in German East Africa and South West Africa after 1907.
Both German South West Africa and German East Africa had experienced serious native unrest from 1905 to 1907. Simultaneously, the Reichstag’s attacks on colonial maladministration and scandals rapidly led to a political crisis in Germany, the 1907 election and the new pro-colonial bloc majority. During this difficult period, Bernhard Dernburg became the new head of the colonial department in Germany. 1 This new minister had played a major role in the 1907 parliamentary election inasmuch as he instilled in the public a new acceptance of the German colonies. His own programme favoured continued colonial expansion as a source of raw materials and tropical products, which the British and the Americans monopolized at that time, an opportunity for large-scale investment into plantations and other colonial ventures and a market for German exports.2 Undoubtedly, Dernburg’s era of “scientific colonization”3 after 1907 constituted a period of increased administrative efficiency. However, it will be seen that the policies initially implemented in East Africa originated not from Dernburg but from Governor Albrecht von Rechenberg, while in South West Africa Dernburg played an even less important role. The relatively high number of settlers in South West Africa combined with the Reichstag’s support for their social and political demands limited his activities to a large extent.
Rechenberg became East Africa’s new governor in April 1906. Soon after taking up his appointment to this post, he realized that the recent Maji Maji uprisings had arisen primarily out of economic hardship. Moreover, he believed that East Africa’s tropical climate and the small number of white settlers rendered the Europeans incapable of assuring the colony’s financial self-sufficiency. So, in order to avoid further uprisings and foster financial independence in the colony, Rechenberg developed the policy of favouring the creation and protection of an indigenous peasant society. His program, later adopted by Dernburg, encouraged African agriculture as the basis of the East African economy. But the pro-colonial bloc parties in Germany favoured a different approach to the development of African colonies, and so interfered with the implementation of Rechenberg’s policy. Furthermore, the Reichstag did not wish to disregard the Europeans’ prerogatives, while the governor considered them a group of secondary importance. The governor’s policies were ultimately reversed by the Reichstag acting on behalf of the small but organized group of East African settlers, who feared for their security and economic interest.4 Initially in favour of Rechenberg’s nativist programme Dernburg eventually succumbed to governmental and settler pressure, and in 1910 returned to his original plans for heavy European capital investment into plantations.5
Rechenberg had an unusual amount of diplomatic and colonial experience behind him when he was appointed Governor of East Africa in 1906. He had functioned as judge in East Africa in 1893 and German Consul in Zanzibar from 1896 - l900.6 The formulation of his nativist policy stemmed from his personal experiences in colonial expansion, his interpretation of the Maji Maji rebellion and an evaluation of the economic conditions which then existed in the territory. His diplomatic career in Eastern Europe (Moscow and Warsaw), also strongly influenced his judgments. He believed, for example, that the economic conditions of the African peasant society were quite comparable to those in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the governor advocated German continental expansion into Eastern Europe rather than Weltpolitik, overseas expansion and a strong navy, and was therefore opposed to the fashionable idea of colonial expansion. 7 Consequently, his measures in East Africa were geared to incur minimal expenses and safeguard the peace in order to divert attention on Eastern Europe. His diplomatic background is again evident in his assessment of the Maji Maji revolt. “From what I have seen so far, I have not the slightest doubt that the recent rising was due to economic causes, and this accords with experience gained in other lands.” 8 He particularly blamed Governor Götzen for trying to stimulate the natives’ productivity by forcing them to work on a cotton field for twenty-eight days and then offering them an insignificant financial reward for their hardship. According to Rechenberg, this policy undoubtedly led to the rebellion.
When he first came to office, Rechenberg scrutinized the viability of European settlements either by way of large plantations favoured by Dernburg and the national liberals or small-scale farming favoured by the conservative party. But European emigration to East Africa had been very slow, and in 1906, out of a total white male population of two thousand five hundred and seventy, only three hundred and fifteen were settlers or planters, the rest consisting of traders, administrative and military personnel.9 Some schemes had been devised to increase the European influx into the colony, but to no avail. For example, in 1905, Governor Götzen had tried to encourage Boers from South Africa to settle on the slopes of mount Meru and in the vicinity of Arusha. However, the Afrikaners, instead of becoming farmers, turned to cattle raising, thus conflicting with the neighbouring Masai tribes. 10 The project was therefore abandoned. Later, Russians of German descent were transported from Russia to East Africa and settled on mount Meru. 11 They were to become the model for small-scale farming. (Kleinsiedlungen). But due to insufficient capital and poor climatic conditions, many of them were forced to seek more favourable areas, while others simply asked to return to Russia. Another attempt had ended in failure. Rechenberg concluded that European settlement was merely an experiment whose success or failure would be discernable only in the distant future,12 and that under the present conditions, it was far too unstable to form the basis of the colony’s economy.
The establishment of plantations did not offer more encouragement than the small settlement schemes. In German East Africa, European agriculture was mainly concentrated in Usambara an area between Tanga along the Pangani river to mount Kilimanjaro and Meru13 because of its easy accessibility from the coast and cooler climate. Land in that region became scarce relatively early, not because of a large number of farms, but due to huge land claims by certain individuals intending to build plantations particularly along the Pangani river.
Coffee was the first commodity grown on European plantations. But the soil was too acidic to produce good crops. Moreover, falling world prices rendered this product uneconomical to the extent that by 1907, none of the coffee plantations were viable. The sisal agave, introduced in 1892 was increasingly adopted as an alternative crop. Though high prices on the world market in the early twentieth century, assured a reasonable profit to sisal growers, this trend was reversed from 1902 to 1911 when slackening demand drastically brought prices down.14 Another problem encountered was the ever-escalating shortage of plantation labour. Europeans commonly believed that Africans were unwilling to work for them. So they asked the government to remedy the situation by straightforward coercion. This solution was of course rejected since it could have led to another African rebellion. Other schemes like resettlement of tribes or the utilization of defeated rebels were tried, but all proved unsatisfactory. Rechenberg believed that a sufficient African labour supply could be forthcoming if adequate incentives were offered. But this suggestion also came to naught due to the lack of co-operation and disunity among the settlers. So, with the labour question unresolved and more and more plantations facing bankruptcy on account of decreasing demand for their products on the world market, the future of the plantations appeared bleak to say the least.
Having witnessed developments in East Africa during the first few months of his term as Governor, Rechenberg slowly drew his conclusions. By the end of 1907 he had ruled out European settlements as the basis of his reconstruction programme. He also rejected the introduction of European methods and tools to replace indigenous agricultural customs. Thus the system he finally adopted aimed at gradual expansion of African agriculture by way of economic incentives. The positive effect of the Uganda railway on African productivity most likely encouraged the governor to opt for this plan. After the railway had reached lake Victoria in 1901, the exportation of African goods between 1903 and 1906 from that remote area of the colony increased fifteen fold, making the German port of Mwanza on lake Victoria the second largest export harbour in the territory.15 As a result, tax revenue increased twelve times, attesting to the Africans’ favourable reaction to this type of stimulant.16
In view of such positive response, Rechenberg thought of expanding railway construction to the peanut growing Nyamwezi of the central highlands, a step which would facilitate the transportation of their goods to the market and ensure profit. In such case, the intermediary would be the network of Indian traders already established throughout the territory. The governor believed that his scheme would increase tax revenue from the colony and the purchase of European goods by the Africans and thereby eventually render East Africa self-sufficient. The prevention of further rebellion was ensured because of minimal European intervention and increased African wealth.17
In singling out the virtually untaxed native settled central highlands for his proposed railway, Rechenberg had made a deliberate choice. He knew that substantial new revenues would be needed to finance the railway, since the Reichstag would never agree to more than a loan to be serviced by the colony.18 In this respect, the Nyamwezi project was well-justified and in accordance with Rechenberg’s principles. The Africans could only increase their production if the railway was built. On the other hand, the railway could only be built if the Africans increased their production.19
The governor’s political intentions are also evident in his refusal to extend the northern railway to Moshi, his argument being that it would pose an unnecessary financial burden, which could not be covered by new revenues since the area was already taxed. That the northern railway was eventually built in spite of the governor’s protest, is indicative as to how far his policy was reversed.20
To ensure the success of his program, Rechenberg protected the Indians, the Africans’ retailers, saw to the strict enforcement of taxation and even tried to divert money from the European sector to his railway scheme. But he first had to convince the home authorities to accepting his policy. His first opportunity to do so came in 1907, when State Secretary Dernburg visited East Africa. Although open-minded and favouring humane treatment of the African, Dernburg had nevertheless supported during the 1906 - 1907 election campaign economic imperialism, European plantations and the extraction of raw materials.21 But his visit to East Africa convinced him otherwise. Rechenberg’s influence, a first-hand experience and a violent disagreement with the settlers changed his mind. The Colonial State Secretary rejected the settlers’ demands in regards to compulsory native labour, his only concession being the provision of labour commissioners to help in the recruitment of contract labour. Dernburg adopted the governor’s other views as well. This is illustrated in his statement:“It is a tough country, and it is difficult to treat properly.
A good land, so long as one lets it follow its natural
direction; a poor country for European experiments.
A good land for merchants; a poor land for farmers.
The small-scale settler will fare especially badly there.” 22
Thus, State Secretary Dernburg returned to Germany with a new programme, which he henceforth promulgated as his own.
Probably uncertain about Dernburg’s steadfastness, Rechenberg soon travelled to Germany in order to defend the new policy and bring the Reichstag to legislate as soon as possible. Together the two officials first visited the Treasury Department. Through their combined influence, this department made the requested changes in the financial structure of the colony; the diversion of business funds and hut tax, of which thirty per cent had hitherto been under the control of communal leagues, to the local colonial government. However, the ministry agreed to the extension of the northern railway to the Pangani river rather than the more distant town of Moshi and to the building of the central railway to Tabora (Unyamwezi), both to be financed by an imperial loan repayable out of the colony’s income. 23 Rechenberg’s Nyamwezi groundnut scheme had so far gained a considerable degree of official acceptance.
Concerned that such measures would endanger their social and economic position, the white settler population of the northern highlands immediately opposed the Colonial State Secretary and Governor Rechenberg powerful association, the Northern league, consisting of settlers and planters from Usambara and Tanganital (Tanga, Pangani and Wilhelmstal) petitioned the Reichstag to reject the new program, since it jeopardized European interests. Although this petition did not find much recognition in the legislature because of its offensive language, one should not underestimate settler support in Germany. Quite to the contrary German settlers were looked upon as a national cause and supported by both the Reichstag and the nation. This can be seen in the budget debates of February l908, when parliamentary members issued warnings against turning East Africa into a “negro land”24 . However, after six weeks of discussions, the new Dernburg-Rechenberg programme was finally approved and the Reichstag voted the imperial loan so crucial to Rechenberg’s policy.
Throughout the debates, Dernburg vigorously defended the new scheme. Yet, as the discussions progressed a new dimension was added in his defence, that is to say, economic imperialism. Thus by l908, Dernburg had partially returned to his original line of argument, slowly transferring the emphasis from self-sufficiency and internal peace to European profit-making. While Dernburg still officially supported the governor, he increasingly demanded concessions from him which in fact amounted to the reversal of the policy based on African agriculture and a free native society towards one furthering European interests.25 This was not due to the Colonial Secretary’s sudden change of heart but to increasing opposition to Rechenberg’s programme in the Reichstag, which in turn was influenced by the settlers’ rejection of his East African nativist policy.
This gradual reversal of the governor’s policies is well illustrated in the example of the Indian community in East Africa. The Indians played a major role in Rechenberg’s reconstruction program, since they were to act as the middlemen buying peanuts from the villages and transporting them to the railway and handling the general retail trade with the Africans. However, Europeans resented the Indians as commercial competitors, labelled them as foreigners and therefore had always supported restricting measures against them.26 In 1906 they had demanded that the Indians be forced to keep their accounts in Swahili instead of their native Gujarati in order to ensure payment of governmental taxes. But when a proposal to this effect was forwarded to Berlin, Dernburg denied his support on Rechenberg’s advice.27 Finally, continued settler agitation and increased pressure from the Reichstag left Dernburg no alternative but to give in to the settlers’ demands and ask his governor to make Swahili or another European language a precondition to Indian immigration into East Africa. Rechenberg refused, arguing that the cost of the necessary controlling agency would be prohibitive and that the influx of people through the vast territorial borders could not possibly be checked. Moreover, he stated that Indian traders were “...indispensable as commercial intermediaries between European firms and the natives.” 28 The Reichstag at last acquiesced and no further action was taken. But this decision was short-lived, since after Rechenberg’s resignation in 1912 the Reichstag did in fact restrict Indian immigration.
Other attacks which threatened to undermine the very concept of the governor’s policies soon followed. Although planned European settlement had been rejected for East Africa, the continuous influx of German immigrants had by 1912 raised the settler population to four thousand seven hundred and forty-four, of which seven hundred and. fifty-eight were farmers and planters.29 Furthermore, whereas crops like cotton, coffee and sisal generally remained unprofitable, small-scale settlers achieved moderate success in 1907 and 1908 with rubber. Over the next two years, the price for this commodity more than doubled, making its cultivation a very lucrative business. For the first time in East African history, the settler population gained a certain measure of success and wealth. These developments took place at precisely the same time as the government adopted Rechenberg’s nativist policies, which made no allowance for such a trend.
Dernburg had also refused to comply with the settlers’ most urgent demand, that is to say, the extension of the northern railway to Moshi. He had accepted Rechenberg’s view that a railway could be built only if the cost of the loan could be absorbed by increased territorial revenues. The northern railway was therefore ruled to be unfeasible, since it would run through an already heavily taxed area.30 But the Colonial State Secretary encountered such strong opposition from the Reichstag that he had to promise to reconsider his position. Throughout 1908-1909, the Reichstag continued to push for immediate extension of the northern railway to Moshi. The government-supporting bloc parties became especially outspoken in their demands. Dernburg finally gave in after his pro-settler under-secretary Lindequist pointed out that the railway would open huge tracks of land to European settlement.31 In 1910 Dernburg’s proposition to do so found immediate acceptance in the legislature, and the construction of the railway was completed a year later. By then, the Colonial State Secretary had clearly abandoned his support of African agriculture in favour of European interests.
Another contentious issue arose when Rechenberg disclosed his labour policies. To promote peaceful relations between Africans and Europeans, he codified the Africans’ rights relating to employment with European farmers and planters. The ordinance stipulated that Africans could only be employed under a legal contract registered with a labour commissioner, that the maximum employment period would be limited to seven months, and that provisions for food allowances, even if the employee was absent from work, medical care, free housing or transport were obligatory. Furthermore, the labour commissioner was authorized to prosecute Europeans or impose disciplinary measures on Africans in case of breech of contract.32 This was a major improvement since there had been no previous legislation extending legal protection to Africans. But Rechenberg’s original intent to impose disciplinary measures on Africans and Europeans alike was vetoed by the Reichstag on the grounds that under the Protectorate Law Europeans could only be tried in court. This amendment seriously undermined the governor’s intention to enhance the natives’ standing, since they were now subject to immediate punishment by the labour commissioner, whereas the Europeans were prosecuted in court with the certainty of a lenient treatment.
Even more serious was Dernburg’s refusal to restrict corporal punishment. Rechenberg had always condemned this practice, and the Colonial State Secretary had gone so far after his visit to East Africa in 1907 as to draft legislation for its complete abolishment. But this legislation was never presented to the Reichstag. When the governor demanded the restriction by law of corporal punishment in 1908 Dernburg because of the Reichstag’s opposition refused outright.33 So use by Europeans of this type of punishment went on unchecked. Government intervention seriously hampered Rechenberg’s labour policies, making them virtual1y ineffective. The white element in East Africa had once again asserted its superior influence at home at the expense of the Governor and of the indigenous population.
But the settlers were not satisfied with their gains. They soon realized that a strong unified body would be more effective at home in Germany. Although the Northern League had operated as a successful pressure group, it could not claim to speak for the whole colony since a multitude of other local settler organizations existed throughout the territory. To remedy the situation, the settlers formed the new Territorial Business League of German East Africa in June 1909, which from then on spoke for all the white settlers in the colony. 34 The main objectives of this league were to maintain and enhance settler support in Germany mainly by sending petitions and resolutions to Reichstag members and by informing the press, and to gain greater settler participation in the administration of the colony. In December 1903 a Governor’s Council had been created in East Africa by Governor Götzen.35 This council had consisted of official and settler members appointed by the governor, the latter being selected from the white male population of the colony.36 It acted in an advisory capacity, mainly on questions relating to colonial budget and decrees. However, the governor could request advice on all matters, while the council had the right to be heard if more than one advisory member requested it.
Contentious issues were decided by majority vote, and official transcripts of the sessions were forwarded to Germany.37 Determined to keep settler influence at a minimum, Rechenberg had appointed only five settler members to the council, but reserved the right to increase the number of official members as the need arose. At the council’s meeting of June 1908, fourteen official members were present, six permanent and eight advisory members.38 The settlers promptly reacted, and demanded more settler members to be elected by the Europeans instead of appointed by the governor. They even asked that the governor be obliged to abide by the council’s decisions. Rechenberg vehemently rejected this proposition, arguing that “The fate of a colony whose revenue, in far the greater part, is drawn from the coloured inhabitants, can scarcely be decided by elements which stand more or less in a conflict of interest with those same inhabitants...”39 The governor managed to uphold his point using as an argument that this would have interfered with the Reichstag’s right to control the budget.40 But in February 1909 the Reichstag nevertheless forced him to grant the settlers an absolute majority in the Governor’s Council. Confronted by the combined opposition of the Territorial League and its powerful supporters in the Reichstag and hoping to prevent more radical changes, the governor felt obliged to increase the settler membership and grant election to the Governor’s Council. Thus, within a few short years the settlers with the aid of the central government and Reichstag gained a large measure of control within the colonial administration.
A similar development took place in the various districts of the colony. As has been mentioned, Rechenberg had planned to divert funds raised in the outlying areas of the colony to the servicing of the imperial loan for the central railway. But here again, supported by the German Parliament, the settlers succeeded in retaining control of at least twenty-five per cent of the district revenues. A further conflict over the composition of the district councils responsible for the allotment of these funds was, against Rechenberg’s protests, arbitrarily decided by the imperial decree of September 1911, thus assuring a settler majority in these decisions.41
Dernburg resigned in 1910 and his successor Friederich Lindequist accelerated the dismantling of Rechenberg’s nativist policy. But the actual reversal had already taken place. Reacting favourably to the clamours of the European settler population and to the economic upswing in East Africa since 1908, the Reichstag had initiated this process by forcing the extension of the northern railway. The dilution of Rechenberg’s labour regulations constituted yet another stage in the process, which was finally concluded by increasing settler influence in the administration of the colony. Whereas, in 1907, government policy favoured African interests, restricted and cheap administration and peace in the colony, by 1910 it had shifted to settler predominance and profit-seeking.
In South West Africa the settlers also gained an ever increasing influence over the affairs of the colony after 1907. Because of its favourable climatic conditions, South West Africa attracted the largest share of German settlers overseas.42 Since the Hereros unproductive method of cattle raising was held to be economically unsound, it was generally acknowledged in government circles that the German settlers would soon become the dominant element in the colony. Governor Leutwein had also accepted the same general idea, although he had planned a gradual and humane conversion to European rule. While favouring European settlement, his policies nevertheless had aimed at protecting the Africans against too-rapid changes or exploitation. The German settlers denounced his policy as too lenient, and pressed instead for the expropriation of African land and cattle, which would be made available to the settlers, while Africans should be coerced to work for Europeans.43
When the Herero-Hottentot uprising broke out in 1904, the German Emperor Wilhelm II immediately transferred his responsibilities to the German War Department, on whose recommendation he appointed General von Trotha in charge of military operations in South West Africa.44 After his arrival in the colony, Trotha declared martial law and thus became the supreme executive authority in the territory. He subsequently embarked on a course of ruthless annihilation of the Africans. His extermination order stipulated that “Inside German territory every Herero tribesman armed or unarmed, with or without cattle, will be shot.” When he heard of this extermination order, Imperial German Chancellor von Bülow strongly opposed it, pointing out to the German Emperor that it was “...contradictory to all Christian and humane principles.” 45 But it was only two months later, after Bülow repeatedly argued that Trotha’s actions would arouse foreign opinion against Germany and shed doubts on her claim to a place amongst civilized nations, that Wilhelm II rescinded the order. Bitter criticism of Trotha also came in this case from the settler population, who resented Trotha’s practice of killing the natives and their cattle. They charged that in so doing he was depriving them not only of an adequate labour force but of future financial wealth as well. In spite of all this criticism Trotha retained absolute control until November 1905, when his powers were transferred to the civil administration headed by Governor Friedrich von Lindequist.46
Although the uprising continued in the southern part of the colony, the northern regions where the greater number of European migrants lived were by that time effectively pacified. A strong proponent of European settlement in all German colonies, Lindequist planned to expropriate the natives, ban native cattle-raising and enforce tough new labour laws.47 Moreover, he encouraged the settlers to fight for increased political participation in the affairs of the colony. It was during Lindequist’s term as Governor that District Councils and a Governor’s Council were created in South West Africa. In spite of these developments the settlers’ powers did not increase, since as in East Africa at the time both the District and Governor’s Councils were mere advisory boards, whose members were arbitrarily appointed by the Governor. All of Lindequist’s plans in regards to the natives were opposed by the anti-colonial Reichstag majority and could therefore not be implemented.
However, after the 1907 general election in Germany and the formation of the pro-colonial Bülow Bloc, this situation changed radically. In the fall of 1907 the government authorized the enforcement of the tough new native regulations in South West Africa, which allowed the expropriation of land belonging to natives who had engaged in hostilities against the Germans. This land was subsequently opened for settlement. Other measures pertained to the confiscation of native cattle and to the control of Africans, who could no longer own or lease land without the governor’s approval. The law also stipulated that no more than ten native families could live together in any given location, and that Africans had to carry identity cards at all times.48 Failure to do so gave any European the right to arrest them. Service books in which all periods of employment were registered further restricted Africans. The severity of these restrictions indicates that the government was determined to prevent further insurrections by destroying the Africans’ tribal structure and forcing them to work for Europeans. These measures also indicate how far the government had moved to support the settlers’ claim to absolute social and economic superiority in the colony.
Although the settlers generally welcomed the new legislation, they continued to agitate for further powers. A longstanding settler grievance, which came to the fore after the outbreak of the Herero-Hottentot uprising of 1904, was the lack of political rights for Europeans in the colony. One of the major arguments voiced by the settlers was that they had gained the right to participate in the decision-making process, since they had emerged during the recent rebellion as the main losers of life and property, for which they blamed bad imperial policy-making.49 To spread their views widely, the Europeans founded associations which held local meetings as well as dispatched representatives to propagate their cause in Germany. How successful the settlers were can be deduced from the fact that in the spring of 1908 the Reichstag passed legislation, which increased their political influence considerably.50 The Self-Government Law, as it subsequently was called, was a major victory for the settlers. A Territorial Council replaced the former Governor’s Council and introduced into the colony a franchise system, by which the European population elected its own members to the Territorial and District Councils.
Furthermore it assured a settler majority on these councils. The Territorial Council of 1908 consisted of eleven settlers and only three government officials, and a year later settler representation was further increased to twenty-seven.51 The Self-Government Order also gave these bodies executive power. The Territorial Council acquired complete authority over native employment and labour questions, while the District Councils had the right to impose local taxes and decide their allocation.52
Thus, within two short years between 1906 and 1908, the South West African settlers gained a predominance unequalled in any other German colony. Their social and economic status was legalized through the native regulations of 1907, while through the Self-Government Law of 1908 they also held decisive political powers in the colony. The post-1907 Reichstag support for settler demands was conducive to the passing of measures in South West Africa. Similarly, the active role played by the Reichstag in the reversal of Rechenberg’s nativist programme in German East Africa gives ample evidence of its new spirit of commitment to the German overseas empire. Prior to 1907 opinions voiced in the legislature had frequently recommended abandoning colonies. But after the crucial election of 1907, during which the German public had so strongly supported the idea of a German empire, the Reichstag seemed determined to live up to its new mandate.
Footnotes (Text is continued thereafter)
1-Zimmermann, p. 312
2-Dernburg, Zielpunkte des Deutschen Kolonialwesens (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1907).
3-Townsend, pp. 246 ff.
4-Iliffe, p. 7.
5-Ibid., p. 78.
6-Henderson in History of East Africa, p. 147. For further information on Rechenberg see Methner, chap. 2.
7-Iliffe, pp. 53 - 54.
8-quoted in Iliffe, p. 55.
9-Iliffe, p. 57.
10-Metbner, pp. 151, 152, 184.
11-Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, 1906, p. 52, and Methner, p. 182.
12-Methner, pp. 182, 183. See also fliffe, p. 57.
13-See map in Harlow, p. 122.
14-Iliffe, p. 69.
15-Zeitscbrift fur Kolonialpolitik, Kolonialbrecht and Kolonial- wirtschaft, 1906, p. 591.
16-Ibid., 1906, pp. 580 ff.
17-Iliffe, p. 71.
18-Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, 1911, pp. 668, 669.
19-Iliffe, p. 75
22-quoted in fliffe, p. 81.
23-Iliffe, p. 89.
24-Ibid., p. 91.
25-Ibid., chap. 6.
26-Ibid., p. 94.
27-Deutsches Kolonialblatt, 1908, pp. 229, 230.
28-quoted in Iliffe, p. 96.
29-Iliffe, p. 57.
30-Dr. Paul Rohrbach, “Rückblick auf unsere koloniale Entwicklung im Jahre 1909 - l0” in Jahrbuch über die deutschen Kolonien, ed. Dr. Karl Schneider (Essen: G.D. Baedeker, Verlagshandlung, 1911), p. 22.
31-Hans Berthold, “Die Besiedlung Deutsch-Südwestafrikas”, in Jahrbuchüber die deutschen Kolonien: ed. Dr. Karl Schneider (Essen:
G.D. Baedeker, Verlagshandlung, 1911), p. 202 and Henderson in History of East Africa, p. 154.
32-Iliffe, p. 103.
33-Deutsches Kolonialblatt, 1908, pp. 220, 221.
34-Iliffe, p. 108.
35-Iliffe, p. 86.
36-Deutsches Kolonialblatt, 1905, supplement, p. 21.
37-Ibid., pp. 21, 22.
38-Iliffe, p. 111.
39-quoted in fliffe, p.111.
40-Deutsches Kolonialblatt, 1905, supplement, pp. 24, 25.
41-Iliffe, p. 124.
42-In 1914 the German population of South West Africa reached 14,830 inhabitants. For further information see Townsend, p. 265.
43-Bley, pp. 80 - 81.
44-Ibid., p. 159.
45-Ibid., p. 163.
46-Ibid., p. 159.
47-Ibid., p. 170.
48-Deutsches Kolonialblatt, 1907, pp. 980 - 982.
49-Bley, p. 185
50-Ibid., p. 229.
5l-Hoffmann, pp. 73, 76 and fliffe, pp. 112, 113.
52-Gerstmeyer, pp. 18 - 20.
In Verbindung stehende Meldungen: